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Introduction
Mineral resources and energy are central to the level of 
technological sophistication that we have come to expect 
in our everyday lives. Yet the availability and use of these 
finite resources is unsustainable, almost by definition, and 
particularly so when considering fragile ecosystems. This 
raises the ‘super-wicked’ policy issue, negotiated through 
resource management legislation, of trying to balance 
necessary resource use with 
not irreparably damaging the 
natural environment (Levin 
et al., 2012). 
This article primarily concerns the effects 
of the Resource Legislation Amendment 
Bill (2015) on management of the exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ) and continental 
shelf area. Omnibus bills that contain non-
technical and contentious amendments 
continue to challenge civil society’s 
ability to fully consider the implications 
of reform. Despite that limitation, the 
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government strengthens requirements for 
marine dumping and disposal consents 
contrary to fears expressed in some select 
committee submissions. It also argues 
that management powers will be further 
concentrated in the responsible minister 
by implementing a board of inquiry 
process for marine consents, building on 
already extensive regulatory powers in the 
EEZ and continental shelf area. Although 
its effects are mixed, the bill may be a 
retrograde step for genuinely consistent, 
sustainable management of the marine 
environment, as too much will depend on 
the government of the day.
Legal and economic context
Possessing sovereign rights over the EEZ 
and continental shelf area to seabed 
mineral resources, among other things, 
New Zealand is effectively obliged to 
implement a marine consent regime. 
Extra-territorial seabed mining is 
currently governed by the Environmental 
Protection Authority (EPA), under the 
Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental 
Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act 2012 
(EEZ Act). The EEZ Act applies from the 
edge of the territorial sea (12 nautical 
miles from the low tide mark) to 200 
nautical miles from shore and, beyond 
that, where a continental shelf factually 
exists to a maximum distance of 350 
nautical miles (Salmon and Grinlinton, 
2015). New Zealand’s marine estate is over 
six million square kilometres in size.
The EEZ Act’s purpose is to ‘promote 
the sustainable management of natural 
resources’ in the exclusive economic zone 
and continental shelf area (s10). It 
‘continues’ implementation of New 
Zealand’s international marine 
obligations: notably, the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) 
and the Convention on the Prevention of 
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes 
and Other Matter (the London 
Convention, 1972).1 Section 12 protects 
certain Mäori interests by emphasising 
aspects of the act which concern Treaty of 
Waitangi interests in EEZ and continental 
shelf area. Generally, sections 10–12 of the 
act roughly analogise with the ‘heart’ of 
the Resource Management Act 1991 
(RMA) as contained in sections 5–8 
(Grant, 2015, p.40).
Recent applications for seabed mining 
consents by Trans-Tasman Resources and 
Chatham Rise Phosphate have stimulated 
public interest in the marine consent 
regime.2 As the EEZ Act mandates a 
precautionary approach (s61(2)), both 
applications were rejected largely because 
of their uncertain environmental effects. 
From a perspective of promoting 
sustainable management, this suggests the 
act is working.
Resource Legislation Amendment Bill
The Ministry for the Environment states 
the Resource Legislation Amendment 
Bill amends the EEZ Act to maintain 
the current balance between enabling 
economic activity and protecting 
environmental features, while reducing 
regulatory burdens on regime users 
(Ministry for the Environment, 2015, 
p.9). In particular, it seeks to avoid costs 
disproportionate to likely environmental 
harms from proposed activities. Main 
amendments include: strengthening of 
information requirements for marine 
waste consents; new ministerial powers 
to make EEZ policy statements, which 
consent authorities must have regard 
to; and a change in the marine consent 
process for notifiable activities under 
section 20 from an EPA assessment to 
a proposed board of inquiry process 
(Resource Legislation Amendment Bill, 
explanatory note). These amendments 
seek to harmonise the EEZ Act process 
with the RMA process as much as possible. 
Later parts of this article address the 
cumulative effects of these amendments.
Procedurally, the Resource Legisla-
tion Amendment Bill is disappointing. 
Omnibus bills should not be used for 
contentious, non-technical amendments 
(Watkins, 2016). They suppress 
meaningful debate in a manner that is 
analogous to the overuse of urgency, 
by giving MPs and civil society a 
comparatively large amount of informa-
tion to review in a shorter period of time. 
This is why omnibus bills were, historic-
ally, typically reserved for implementing 
non-contentious amendments.3 
Environmental policy matters are 
hotly contested by non-governmental 
organisations and industry representa-
tives. To illustrate, this bill received 
hundreds of submissions at select 
committee. Substantial, sustained con-
troversy around the bill’s effects on the 
RMA wrenches scrutiny away from the 
EEZ and continental shelf to land 
resources instead. The distraction is 
enough to raise the question of whether 
the bill, notwithstanding its policy goals, 
misuses the omnibus procedure. A stand-
alone bill would have been preferable 
because it would improve the transparency 
and publicness of EEZ reform.
The point is not purely academic. 
Overuse of omnibus legislation can lead 
to technical mistakes, which may have 
disproportionately consequential effects. 
For example, the EPA is required under 
section 45(1)(c) to directly notify iwi of 
consent applications that affect their 
interests ‘in order to recognise and respect’ 
the Crown’s treaty obligations (EEZ Act, 
s12). Awkwardly, section 45 was repealed 
in the initial draft. Were the obligation not 
re-enacted (clause 188, proposed section 
47(1)(b)(ii)), the Crown could conceivably 
have fallen short of the behaviour 
expected of a model treaty partner. 
Section 12’s reference to a section that will 
no longer exist but whose content is 
preserved elsewhere is a minor technical 
Omnibus bills are frequently complex 
in nature, with many consequential 
amendments, and are thus typically less 
likely to meet the exacting standards of 
quality that we should expect. 
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error that was corrected at select 
committee. Nonetheless, this error 
demonstrates that mistakes can and do 
arise through inadequately scrutinised 
amendment procedures. Not all will be 
harmless or noticed in a timely fashion.
The bill’s omnibus nature limits the 
extent to which changes to the marine 
consent regime face adequate public and 
parliamentary scrutiny. Omnibus bills are 
frequently complex in nature, with many 
consequential amendments, and are thus 
typically less likely to meet the exacting 
standards of quality that we should expect. 
These two factors mean omnibus 
amendment procedures are not to be 
preferred for contentious programmes of 
reform.
Regulating marine wastes
This article has been written in part 
because some submitters at select 
committee argued that the bill’s change 
to the definition of dumping would 
loosen domestic requirements for marine 
dumping consents, in violation of the 
London Convention and the Convention 
for the Protection of the Natural 
Resources and Environment of the South 
Pacific Region (Nouméa Convention, 
1990).4 However, New Zealand’s domestic 
regulation meets international obligations 
and appears to be strengthened by the 
bill, especially in relation to adaptive 
management and decommissioning 
offshore installations. 
International marine waste obligations
Signatories to the London Convention’s 
1996 protocol, including New Zealand, 
are obliged to ban unauthorised dumping 
and may choose to consent to dumping 
of certain ‘Annex 1 materials’ – relevantly, 
‘inert, inorganic geological material’ that 
is not radioactive (London Convention, 
annex 1). Consents must meet certain 
requirements under annex 2. The EEZ 
Act bans dumping and disposal and 
regulates marine consents. Therefore, 
the government initially appears to meet 
its obligations to prevent and reduce 
dumping. To show otherwise would 
require arguing that the consent regime is 
defective by, for example, not adequately 
assessing environmental impacts in terms 
of the convention. This argument was not 
advanced in the selection of submissions 
reviewed and would require specific and 
in-depth evaluation.
General prohibitions of dumping and 
discharges are not amended. The bill 
merely alters the definition of ‘dumping’ 
to reflect the protocol’s definition, rather 
than the original definition (cause 184). 
Additionally, the London Convention 
explicitly excluded seabed mineral mining 
wastes from the definition of ‘dumping’ 
from the beginning. Accordingly, the 
Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental 
Shelf (Environmental Effects – Discharge 
and Dumping) Regulations 2015 have 
regulated seabed mineral mining wastes 
as ‘discharges’ at least since February 2014 
(regulations 7–11). Discharges from 
industrial mining continue to be defined 
as discretionary activities in regulations, 
meaning that a marine discharge consent 
is still required (regulations 10, 33). 
It is not legally significant that the 
Nouméa Convention’s definition of 
‘dumping’ fails to include the exemption 
of seabed mining wastes included in the 
London Convention (article 2(b)). The 
Nouméa Convention explicitly regulates 
seabed mineral exploitation in article 8, 
which only creates an obligation to ‘take 
all appropriate measures to prevent, 
reduce and control pollution’ caused by 
seabed mining. Taken with the provision 
that the Nouméa Convention is not 
intended to alter interpretation of the 
London Convention (articles 4–5), article 
8’s relatively permissive obligation is likely 
satisfied by the EEZ Act and an attendant 
precautionary approach.
Article 8’s existence in itself suggests 
seabed mining wastes are not captured by 
article 10’s ban on the dumping of 
harmful substances. Further, article 10 
gives effect to the 1972 London 
Convention by only banning dumping of 
harmful substances, which is less 
restrictive than the 1996 protocol’s general 
ban on dumping. This is to be expected 
given that the Nouméa Convention 
predates the protocol, but it also shows 
that suggestions that the Nouméa 
Convention treats dumping more 
stringently than the EEZ Act regime does 
are not sustainable.
In this light, New Zealand’s regulatory 
regime seems to comply with the Nouméa 
and London conventions. Although the 
bill would have understandably looked 
concerning to interested members of the 
public, more direct consideration suggests 
that allegations that it breaches New 
Zealand’s obligations under the 
conventions are not credible, at least on 
the reviewed arguments advanced before 
the select committee.
Regulation of marine wastes improved
Ecological sustainability requires under-
standing the consequences of human 
activity. This observation underpins 
the EEZ Act’s information principles, 
supporting the precautionary principle. 
The act’s information principles and 
precautionary approach constitute the 
‘mind’ of our marine consent regime 
(Grant, 2015, p.40).
The EEZ Act presently requires 
consent authorities, when refusing 
consents by reason of inadequate 
information as to environmental effects, 
to consider whether applying adaptive 
management principles would allow the 
activity to begin (s61(3)). Adaptive 
management is a form of management 
ethic designed to overcome inadequate 
information by permitting novel activities 
to proceed under intense scrutiny (s4(2)). 
The bill will continue to exclude adaptive 
Adaptive management is a form of 
management ethic designed to overcome 
inadequate information by permitting 
novel activities to proceed under intense 
scrutiny ...
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management principles from the 
consideration of marine dumping and 
disposal consents (clause 195).5 
Removing adaptive management 
practices strengthens precaution by 
requiring applicants to demonstrate in 
advance, with sufficient evidence, that 
proposed activities will have limited 
environmental consequences. It is 
appropriate to require that one-off or 
similarly limited activities be justified on 
their faces because, unlike more prolonged 
activities, the prospect for monitoring 
ongoing environmental effects through 
adaptive management is restricted.
Despite being reorganised, the bill 
retains the requirement that an application 
for a dumping permit must be refused if 
the waste can be reused, recycled or 
treated in a way that does not have a more 
than minor effect on human health or 
cost more than the consent authority 
considers reasonable, or if the consent 
authority believes dumping is ‘not the 
best approach’ to waste disposal (clause 
193). This may suggest, rather than 
approaching marine wastes from 
perspectives endorsing ‘weak 
sustainability’, a continued sensitivity in 
the overall scheme of the EEZ Act to the 
idea that ‘environmental capital’ and 
financial capital are not fully 
interchangeable.
Further, new requirements for offshore 
installation operators to prepare 
decommissioning plans will be captured 
by the above changes to dumping rules 
(clause 217). Laws of the sea already 
permit offshore installation structures to 
be dumped (abandoned) provided that 
navigation of the seas and other similar 
matters are not infringed (United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, article 
78(2)). Subject to these requirements, 
dumping regulations are the primary, 
currently existing environmental require-
ments governing decommissioning of 
offshore installations.
Currently the government has no 
power to force decommissioning of an 
installation (Ministry for the 
Environment, 2015, p.21). If a marine 
dumping consent were rejected for 
whatever reason, installation owners 
could theoretically ‘fake’ the continued 
operation of the rig. This enables 
operators to avoid compliance with 
environmental standards. Current 
applicable penalties are too low, compared 
to the potentially massive costs of 
decommissioning, to incentivise 
compliance (ibid., pp.21-3). Fortunately 
the bill rectifies this regulatory gap by 
requiring decommissioning plans, 
requiring plans to comply with applicable 
regulations, and requiring owners to 
actually apply for consents for any 
discretionary activities included within 
the plans. Thus, the bill ensures that 
owners of installations can be compelled 
by government to meet their legal 
obligations at the end of an installation’s 
life. Stewardship of the marine 
environment is notably enhanced.
Overall assessment
Although some changes to the marine 
wastes regime arguably cut both ways, 
the bill strengthens environmental 
protection. In particular, marine waste 
consents should be more difficult to 
obtain. However, neither the regulatory 
impact statement nor the explanatory 
note of the bill emphasise this change 
in environmental policy. Full and 
effective regulatory impact statements 
are important because they enable civil 
society and parliamentarians to undertake 
due diligence before participating in the 
legislative process. It may turn out that 
the analysis was incomplete or in some 
other way unsatisfactory for this educative 
purpose.
Possibly these amendments are mere 
clarifications of the existing intended 
position under the EEZ Act, but a failure 
to seize potential political capital seems 
odd. Because disposal of wastes is integral 
to mining operations, applications for 
marine disposal consents will be heard by 
boards of inquiry while considering the 
main marine consent.6 A potential 
explanation for this silence is that the 
government anticipates that boards of 
inquiry, guided by ministerial policy 
statements, will be less stringently 
protective of the environment despite 
apparently more onerous legal 
considerations. 
Marine consent process new, not necessarily 
improved
Clause 188 of the bill replaces sections 
35–58 of the current EEZ Act regime. 
In particular, it provides that consent 
applications for publicly notifiable 
activities otherwise prohibited by section 
20 are to be heard by boards of inquiry 
(clause 188, proposed sections 53-8). 
Boards are composed of three to five 
members, appointed by the minister 
(proposed section 53). Boards replace 
the EPA in substantive decisions on 
such applications, with the intention 
to harmonise marine consents with the 
RMA’s scheme for ‘projects of national 
significance’ (explanatory note).
Non-notified activities, defined in 
regulations under the act, will still be 
determined by the EPA (proposed sections 
51–2). However, non-notifiable consents 
relating to notifiable consents (for 
example, disposal of mining wastes 
stemming from mining operations 
covered by section 20) would be heard by 
a board when considering a notifiable 
consent (proposed section 45). This 
avoids a situation where, for example, a 
board permits a mining operation but the 
EPA does not permit associated waste 
disposal.
All section 20 activities are publicly 
notifiable unless regulations provide 
otherwise (EEZ Act, ss20, 29D). However, 
Because disposal of wastes is integral 
to mining operations, applications for 
marine disposal consents will be heard 
by boards of inquiry while considering 
the main marine consent ...
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not every marine activity captured by 
section 20 of the EEZ Act is likely to be 
significant in its effects. Even industry 
partners are concerned by the breadth of 
the new process’s application and its 
potential to raise costs for non-
contentious section 20 consent 
applications (Petroleum Exploration and 
Production Association of New Zealand, 
2016, p.7). This suggests that the board of 
inquiry model may be miscalibrated in its 
scope. Alternatively, the responsible 
minister may intend to increase the 
number of activities deemed non-
notifiable, but this would be to exclude 
public participation in the consent 
process. Neither option is ideal.
In the light of industry concern, 
scepticism about the bill’s aims is justified. 
If boards of inquiry come to decisions 
otherwise identical to an independent 
EPA’s, then the differentiation must be by 
cost. Yet cost is presumably tied to the 
processes which confine decision makers 
rather than to their identities. If the 
problem with the status quo is cost, it is 
not clear a board of inquiry will be 
inherently cheaper than consideration by 
the EPA. Implementing a process the 
minister will have more control over, 
rather than simply ‘fixing’ the EPA’s 
process, suggests that more ministerial 
control – resulting in substantively 
different decisions – is one of the bill’s 
true aims.
This intention to centralise power is 
demonstrated by introducing sections 
37A–G, which create a planning tool 
called an ‘EEZ policy statement’ (proposed 
sections 37A–G). Section 37C outlines 
mandatory relevant considerations for 
issuance of a policy statement; namely:
(a) the actual or potential effects of the 
use, development, or protection of 
natural resources; and 
(b) New Zealand’s obligations under any 
international conventions that relate 
to the marine environment; and
(c) the matters in subpart 2 of Part 1; and
(d) any submissions received on the 
proposed EEZ policy statement; and
(e) any other matter that the Minister 
considers relevant.
Subsection (c) is referring to sections 
10–12 of the EEZ Act, the ‘heart’ of the 
regime. Despite some concerns expressed 
at select committee by the Environment 
and Conservation Organisations of New 
Zealand (Environment and Conservation 
Organisations of New Zealand, 2016, 
p.21), nothing whatsoever is affected by 
the fact that the minister merely ‘may’ 
(rather than ‘must’) have regard to these 
considerations when conducting initial 
policy work on EEZ policy statements 
(proposed section 37A). An elected 
government has the privilege to determine 
their own policy agenda free of legal 
fetters, so different treatment between 
sections 37A and 37C is manifestly 
justifiable. Section 37C sets hard 
obligations on the executive before policy 
statements will have any planning effect 
(clause 190(6)). These are legally binding 
criteria for executive discretion, and bring 
a needed additional degree of certainty 
into the consent process for applicants 
(Resource Management Law Association, 
2016, p.315).
However, ‘[u]nder any system of 
regulation, the quality of the decision 
makers and trust in their competence and 
integrity is a paramount factor’ (Palmer, 
2013, p.145); ministerial control over the 
policy statement process could therefore 
be more concerning to some. Ministers 
determine processes for issuing policy 
statements, provided ‘adequate time and 
opportunity’ is allowed for comments 
from those affected (proposed section 
37B). The bill gives wide discretion. It is 
non-prescriptive about the process, 
suggesting limited prospects for judicial 
review oversight. Moreover, it is unclear 
that an expedited process will involve 
adequate consultation with iwi.7 Similarly, 
it is instructive that the Ministry for the 
Environment consulted with industry and 
the EPA, but not community groups, 
when preparing the bill (Ministry for the 
Environment, 2015, pp.52-4). With an 
arguably applicant-focused record, 
whether the minister and Ministry for the 
Environment will be seen as good 
custodians of non-industry interests after 
the bill is passed is an open question. If 
not, the new regime will not inspire 
confidence among environmental and 
other community groups or iwi.
Being able to trust the executive is 
especially important because the purpose 
of EEZ policy statements is to state 
objectives and policies to ‘support 
decision-making on applications for 
marine consents’ (proposed section 
37A(1)). This purpose is narrower than its 
RMA cognate’s focus on ‘matters of 
national significance that are relevant’ to 
statutory purposes (RMA, s45(1)). 
Because policy statements thus designed 
are effectively instructions to consent 
authorities,8 often minister-appointed 
boards, on how to approach decisions, 
that the minister makes effective policy 
without also overreaching is critical. 
While the ‘heart’ and ‘mind’ of the 
EEZ Act regime are relatively unamended 
by the bill, introducing boards of inquiry 
and EEZ policy statements will hand 
increasing power of the ‘limbs’ to sitting 
governments (Grant, 2015, p.40). Three 
key features of the current regime are 
public participation in the consenting 
process, comprehensive and impartial 
consideration of matters under section 59 
when granting consents, and the removal 
of power from the minister to the EPA 
(Palmer, 2013, p.142-5). Each feature, but 
particularly the last, is pared back by the 
bill. 
When trying to determine the effects 
of this bill, a lot depends on the specific 
minister responsible for sustainable 
management of the EEZ. But, as above, 
As protection of the seabed has 
been vigilant to date, one possible 
interpretation of the proposed reforms 
is that the bill is designed to massage 
decisions more favourable to industry.
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the minister may be tempted to regulate 
to make more section 20 activities non-
notifiable, to issue potentially intrusive 
policy statements to force certain 
consenting outcomes, and to stack boards 
of inquiry with like-minded decision 
makers. These are all reasons the EPA is 
the presently responsible consent 
authority. In a context requiring rapid 
protection of the environment, it is 
perhaps undesirable in principle to expose 
marine consents to political contestation 
that will limit sustained action. Allowing 
EEZ management to be tied so closely to 
governmental objectives may destabilise 
cross-party consistency in the marine 
management regime. Such exposure 
would mark a sea change in policy settings 
which may be seen as sufficient to 
undermine the EEZ Act’s scheme. 
Conclusion
The net effect of the bill’s amendments is 
difficult to precisely quantify in advance. 
There is a seemingly clear improvement 
in marine waste regulations, as outlined 
above. However, this may or may not be 
offset by increased ministerial control 
over consenting authorities and processes. 
Additional governmental control of the 
consenting regime undermines at least 
one key feature of the status quo, and 
potentially others if ministerial authority 
is eagerly exercised. The precise effects 
depend on the minister in question.
As protection of the seabed has been 
vigilant to date, one possible interpretation 
of the proposed reforms is that the bill is 
designed to massage decisions more 
favourable to industry. The EPA held that 
rejecting applications by Trans-Tasman 
Resources and Chatham Rise Phosphate 
was exactly what sustainable management 
demanded because adaptive management 
practices were inadequate at the time to 
mitigate unknown environmental costs. 
That position was defensible and the 
applicants had the right to resubmit their 
applications with updated proposals if 
they disagreed. If these decisions spurred 
the present reforms, leaving aside 
questions of economic value, then to see a 
functioning statutory regime undermined 
might not suggest to casual observers that 
sustainable management will be protected 
by these reforms. If so, it is fair to ask 
whether the best interests of the exclusive 
economic zone and continental shelf area 
are indeed served by this bill.
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